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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR A. NAUMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.HAROLD K. BEECHER AND
ASSOCIATES, a Utah Corporatio11, and HAROLD K. BEECHER,
an Individual.
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10609

Brief of Amici Curiae
l\IA Y IT PLEASE THE COURT:
The Amici file this brief on permission of the Court
granted, pursuant to Amici 's petition, and order of the
Court. Amici represent the Utah Chapter of the American Institute of Architects.
The American Institute of Architects is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State
of New York with its principal administrative and executive offices in Washington, D.C. The Institute is a
profossional organization of over twenty thousand nine
1
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hundred and seventy eight (20,978) corporate members,
all of whom are registered architects. The Associatio 11
has been in existence for over a century, and its membership includes a majority of the architects registered
to practice that profession in the United States. There
are 155 Chapters in the 50 states of the Union.
The Utah Chapter was founded in 1921 and currently has 267 members. More than 90% of all resident
registered architects practicing in the State of Utah are>
members of the Utah Chapter of the American Institute
of Architects.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND REASON
FOR INTERCESSION
The plaintiff in this case claims damages against
Harold K. Beecher and Associates, Inc., an architectural
firm, for personal injuries which he received from the
cave-in of an excavation. The plaintiff was employed
by Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the prime contractor,
which entered into a contract with Salt Lake County and
Salt Lake City for the construction of a City-County
complex.
The defendant architects were employed under contract by Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City to prepare
plans and specifications in connection ·with the construction. The form of the contract between the joint authority and the architects is similar to such architectural
contracts in use throughout the country during 1960
when the defendant architects entered into their agreement with the joint authority.
2
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After hearing the architects' motion to dismiss, the
District Court ruled that plaintiff's complaint failed to
state a claim against them. This Court in Nauman v.
Harokl K. Beecher & Associates, 19 Utah 2d 101, 426
P2cl G21 ( 1967), in reversing the lower court's decision
ht'!d that Xauman's secornl amended complaint stated
a claim against the defendant architects. Through dicta,
tl1is Court indicated that if the architects knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known the excavation was unsafe, the plaintiff had the right and the
eonesponcling duty to stop the work. Judgment in favor
of the plaintiff was granted by the District Court after
hPariug the case de novo.
The decision of this Court and the District Court in
this cause vitally affects the interests of all architects
who perform services pursuant to such contracts. Since
it represents a majority of the architects in the State
of Utah, the Utah Chapter of the American Institute of
Architects has sought lea,·e to intervene amici curiae to
present certain points and authorities.
THE ARCHITECTS HEREIN HAD NO DUTY TO
PRESCRIBE OR TO INTERFERE -WITH THE
CONTRACTOR'S METHODS OF DOING
HIS WORK.
The architect, by contract and by custom, has a definite function and specific role in connection with the
planning and drawing of specifications for structures.
He is, however, not the contractor and, in fact, the pro-

3
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f essional standards adopted by and enforced by the
American Institute of Architects prohibit him from engaging in building contracting. 1
The instant decision appears to controvert the normal function of the architect in designing and planning
structures into a kind of super safety-engineer who guarantees the safety and well being of all persons employed
on the project. He is not, and cannot be such a creature
for a multitude of practical and economic reasons. It is
respectfully submitted that the subject decision strays
from established law with respect to the role of an architect in the designing and planning of structures and
places upon him a responsibility which is not contemplated by the architect's professional status, by his contract with his employer, or by the laws of Utah and other
states which have considered the matter.
The construction industry in Utah like the industry
generally throughout the 50 states is founded upon a
system of competitive bidding. The usual practice, calls
for an architect to prepare plans and specifications, on
the basis of which bids are invited and received from contractors. Bids, most often are sought and obtained from
a substantial number of contractors to insure that the
lowest possible bid is obtained. These contractors, generally speaking, have little flexibility in labor aml material bid cost items. What breathes life into the system
of competitive bidding is the variety of approaches and
construction methods employed by contractors as deter1

Standards of Profession Practice: "I, 3 an Architect shall not engage in

building contracting." (1964)

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mined by their equipment, personnel, experience, ingenuity and creativity in the use of such equipment and
personnel. It can be seen that the feasibility of doing
the work at the bid price depends in large measure upon
the contractor's methods. His methods are crucial to
tlw entire system. If the owner or the architect were to
attempt either to prescribe the methods to be used, or to
interfere with the contractor after he had begun to proceed using his methods, the system of competitive bidding would break down and the construction of buildings
would be engulfed in a circus-like series of architectowner-contractor orders and counter-orders. Utter chaos
would reign supreme if the contractor gave an order to
use certain equipment, personnel and know-how, and his
order was countermanded by the architect to use another
method of performing the work requiring different
equipment, skill, technique and judgment.
The objective of the industry is to erect buildings
properly and safely. The contractural relationships
which are customarily established and which were present here leave the contractor free to do his work as he
sees fit and as he had agreed to do. The architect has a
duty to see that the structure which results conforms to
contract documents, but he is not a super-contractor and
he is not a safety-engineer on the project. Nor is there
any evidence that casting the architect in such a role
would reduce the hazards which attend construction.
In European countries, no distinction of function is
drawn in the construction community between architect
and contractor. The individual who plans and designs a
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building is the individual who actually builds it. However, there is no evidence to indicate that construction
per man hour worked in Europe is any safer than in this
country, even though the responsibility for all phases of
a given project are centered in one or an association of
individuals.
In the construction community in this country the
contractor is not answerable to the architect for the
safety of the project. The architect is not, at least with
respect to the methods of doing the work, intended to
function as a protector of the contractor's employees.
(In many instances, this would mean that the architect
would be required to follow up, check, and correct, the
work of the very persons whose own negligence brought
about their injuries.)
If the architect is required to be informed about and
correct the methods of doing the work employed by the
contractor, it would mean that every structure would
have to be subject to the architect's review. If this were
done, it must be done on every structure - the thousands
which are erected without incident as well as the occasional ones where accidents occur. Such a burden upon
architects, it is submitted, will destroy the huge construction industry in this country which has functioned well
without the imposition of liability upon the architect,
and any supposed safety advantage will be disproportionate to the havoc visited upon the system. The couf usion which such a pattern of "checks-and-balances"
would cause among contractor, architect, and owner,
would almost inevitably precipitate more accidents than
6
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it would prevent. That the architect, by contract and
custom is not a super safety-engineer on a project, is
manifest by the general rule that the duty to "supervise
the work" creates a duty merely to see that the structure
during construction and upon completion, complies with
the plans and specifications. Garden City Floral Co. v.
Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P 2d 352; Day v. U.S. Radiator
Corporation, 241 La. 288, 128 So 2d 660; Clinton v.
Boehm, 124 N.Y.S. 789, 139 App. Div. 73.
Our research has not revealed a single case in the
area, which contravenes the general rule by holding that
an architect's "duty to supervise" imposes a corresponding duty to prescribe, and if needs be, interfere
with the contractor's methods of doing the work in order
to insure safety of operation. Under scrutiny, the cases
often cited as supportive of the proposition that the
''duty to supervise'' broadens the architect's horizon of
liability, reveal themselves to be in harmony with the
time-honored line of demarcation which renders an architect liable for the negligent preparation of plans and
specifications, and for negligent failure to demand strict
compliance with plans and specifications, but not for
failure to prescribe the contractor's mode of operation.
The cases too, are distinguishable on their facts from the
case at bar.
Montijo v. Swift 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963) involved
an error in the planning and design of the ultimate structure in that the handrail ended short of the bottom step
'
and the visual illustration created by the wall tile caused
the plaintiff to mistake the last step for the bottom plat7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

form. This case has nothing to do with the problem here
presented (whether an architect is liable for injury resulting from unsafe construction methods employed by
the contractor), because the architect there was negligent
in the preparation of the plans and specifications which
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.
Erhart v. Hammonds 232 Ark. 133, 334 S. W. 869 is
factually dissimilar to the case for decision for the reason that the defendant architects had by contract accepted complete responsibility for the supervision of
construction, a responsibility which Harold K. Beecher
& Associates, at no time undertook.
The most salient features of the Erhart case are that
the architects requested and received $12,000.00, as an
additional fee over and above their architectural fee, for
supervision, and that the plans and specifications with
respect to the shoring of the deep excavation were prepared in great detail by the architects. The architect'B
field supervisor drove his car up close to the excavation
just as the rain-soaked excavation "·alls collapsed. Certainly, under those circumstances the architects had actively participated in the very methods of construction
which were the subject of the lawsuit. Moreover, as the
dissenting opinion makes clear, the liability of the architects was predicated substantially (if not entirely) upon
the driving of the automobile up to the edge of the
excavation.
In the Nauman case there was no special agreement
supported by additional consideration to supervise the
work, there were no specifications detailing the shoring
8
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operations to be employed by the contractor other than
that he was to comply with all state and city safety regulations. As is customary, the manner and method of
excavation were left entirely up to the contractor.
Likewise, Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. 2d
393, 259 P2d 934 is factually at odds with the case before
the Court. There it was pleaded that the architect's
plans and specifications were defective in that they provided for sheathing of insufficient strength to support
workman. The architect was exhonerated when it was
made to appear that the sheathing specifications were
adequate in every detail. The county was held liable for
the reason that its agents, the architects with knowledge,
allowed inferior sheathing to be installed. The pleadings
in the case had not charged the architects with failure
to adequately supervise and enforce the plans and specifications. But even if the pleadings had so charged, the
case would not be precedent for the proposition that a
duty to supervise the work requires the architect to
supervise, and if needs be, prescribe for the contractor
the actual methods for doing the work. The learning
from the case is merely that an architect is liable for
negligence in failing to require strict compliance with
the plans and specifications by the contractor.
It can be seen that the Montijo, Erhart and Paxton
eases were all decided along traditional lines of authority. They all hold that an architect is only liable for
negligent failure to require strict compliance with plans
and specifications and/or for negligence in the actual
preparation of plans and specifications.
9
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Perhaps the most recent and celebrated case in the
area of architect liability is that of Miller v. DeWitt, 37
Ill 2d 273, 226 N.E. 2d 630 (1967). The Miller case i 8
significantly different from the case at bar because the
architects were found guilty of negligence through their
failure to properly put the stress factors on the plans.
Furthermore, an Illinois statute imposed a duty on architects to require that contractors employ adequate and
safe shoring methods in ''inherently complex, delicate
and hazardous situations.'' A further distinction in
Miller is that the Court found the removal of the prosceuium truss and end columns to be a matter which ... "
was inherently complex, delicate and hazardous.'' In
other words, the statute impressed a duty on the architects under such circumstances to insure that safe shoring methods were employed due to the hazardous nature
of the work. No such duty was imposed by statute upon
Harold K. Beecher & Associates, nor did the architectural firm make any errors or omissions in the plans and
specifications with respect to the excavation.
·we invite the Court's attention to the case of Garden City Floral Company v. Hunt (cited above). This
was a suit by the owner against the contractor and his
surety for damage to a building caused by the negligence
of the contractor in excavating in an improper manner,
while constructing a new adjoining building for the
owner. The defendants contended that the specifications
contemplated the employment of an architect to give
"full supervision" to the work and that since the architect as the owner's agent had not supervised the method
of performing the excavation, the owner would not be
10
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entitled to recover from the defendants. The Court held
that this "full supervision" as contemplated by the contract did not include any supervision of the contractor's
method of performing the work. The Court said at 255
P. 2<l 357 of the report:
''To say that he must supervise the method of
doing the work before there is full supervision
would place the architect in an entirely different
role from that of an architect."
'' ... As a matter of law the courts recognize that
an architect merely supervises the results and
does not dictate the methods when not controlled
by the specifications.''
CONCLUSION
The imposition on Harold K. Beecher & Associates,
of a duty of continuous supervision of construction methods is neither contemplated by, nor given under the
defendant architect's contract with the owner. The
instant decision represents a radical departure from the
traditional rule that architects are liable only for negligent preparation of plans and specifications or negligence through failure to require strict adherence to the
plans and specifications. The departure is unwarranted
and will cause ruinous results upon the construction industry and substantial additional expense to the public.
The dissenting opinion in the Miller case sums up
the consequences for the public and the industry if the
rase for decision is affirmed:
''If the duty of architects is expanded to require
that they be on the job at all times and prescribe

11
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methods of construction or be held liable for the
negligence of the contractor, they will reflect the
added hurden in their supervision fees. All of this
adds up to a11 additional and, I think, unnecessarv
and unwarranted financial burden upon the publi.c
without a commensurate benefit.''
''The huge construction industry in this country
has functioned well without the imposition o.f
liability on architects and engineers who design,
but do not build, structures and other facilities.
I see no justification for extending the common
law to place liability on architects."
THE ARCHITECTS HEREIN ARE NOT LIABLE
AS THIRD PARTIES WITHIN THE MEANING
OF WORKMEN COMPENSATION LAWS
Section 25-1-62 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
inter alia:
When any injury or death for which compensation is
payable under this title shall have been caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in tlic
same employment, the injured employee, or in case of
death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative
may also have an action for damages against such third
person.
As is evident from a reading of section 35-1-62,
Utah, like most states through its workmen's compensation laws, subjects third persons outside the employeremployee relationship to common law tort liability, but
such subjection to liability only applies to persons not
in the sarne employment as the injured employee.
12
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In commenting upon the meaning of ''person not in
the same employment'' this Court in Cook v. Peter
Kiewit Construction Company ,15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P2d
Gl6 (1963), said it "seems plainly designed to apply to
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers
jointly engaged in the same endeavor." In the subject
case, plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained
while working on a diversion tunnel. Plaintiff was an
employee of Coker Construction Company which had a
contract with Kiewit to construct the tunnel. Under the
contract arrangement Coker and Kiewit agreed to share
profits and losses. Defendant contended that plaintiff
was in its employ and therefore, it was immune from
common law tort liability under the exclusive remedy
provision of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.
This court in reversing the lower court's refusal to
grant defendant's motion for summary judgment held
that plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, and as
such, defendant was immune from common law tort
liability.
Though the court found a joint venture and stated
that in a joint venture arrangement "the partnership
entity should be regarded as the employing unit; and
the employees of both companies as engaged in the same
<>mployment,'' the real basis for decision seems to be
that both employers were engaged in a common endeavor. Indeed, the dissenting opinion claimed that the
majority placed little reliance on the formal elements of
a joint venture in reaching their decision.

13
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Applying the rationale of Kiewit to the case for
decision, it would appear that Harold K. Beecher & Assosiates, and the plaintiff were in the same employment
and were co-workers jointly engaged in the same endeavor. The plaintiff's employer, Christiansen Brothers,
Inc., and the defendant architects were all working for
the joint authority towards a common goal - construction of the City-County complex.
The defendant architects provided the plans and
specifications for the project and furnished supervision
to see that all materials used conformed to the grade and
quality specified and to see that each completed phase of
construction met specifications. Christiansen Brothers,
Inc., plaintiff's employer, furnished the materials and the
labor to place the materials. Under such circumstances
can it be said that the architects were strangers to the
employment of the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The architects respectfully submit that they, under
the doctrine of Kiewit, were co-workers with the plaintiff
engaged in a common endeavor to construct a CityCounty complex and therefore, are immune from common law tort liability under the exclusive remedy
provision of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.
ALLAN E. MECHAM, Esq.
Amici Curiae
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 322-2516
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